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I. Introduction
As today's society becomes increasingly litigious, document
productions, a major discovery tool,1 are growing larger.2 One
inevitable consequence of this phenomenon is the increased risk'
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34. The recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that became effective on December 1, 1993, should not alter the fact that
document productions are a key discovery tool. In fact, if anything, the revisions
reinforce the importance of document productions as the amendments to Rule 26
include a mandatory initial disclosure of unprotected discoverable information. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
2. See Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 937
(S.D. Fla. 1991) (disclosing that counsel and a paralegal "prepared thousands of pages
of documents for inspection"), aff'd in part, question certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (11th
Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 483
(E.D. Va. 1991) (revealing thatbetween 15,000 and 50,000 documents were inspected
for a document production); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179,
181 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (stating that approximately 6000 documents were reviewed by
counsel "in preparation for defendants' inspection"); Baker's Aid, A Div. of M.
Raubuogel Co. v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., No.CV87-0937, 1988 WL 138254, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) (disclosing that attorney examined more than 5,000
documents in order to respond to a document request); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (observing that 16,000
pages were inspected in response to a document production request); W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (noting that the case
involved "a voluminous amount of discovery").
3. In addressing the heightened risk that results from this phenomenon, one court
observed that "it cannot be doubted that this was a large document production carrying
with it a substantial risk that privileged documents might be inadvertently disclosed."
Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483; see also Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., Inc.
v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1988) (revealing that privileged
documents can "slip through the cracks" in large document productions). Similarly,
another court noted that in large document productions "[m]istakes of this type [the
inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege in cases with voluminous discovery]
are likely to occur.. . ..." United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F.
Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (emphasis added). See generally CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93, at 131 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) (discussing whether voluntary, but inadvertent disclosure should result
in waiver); Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence
of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege, 42
CATH. U. L. REv. 465, 467 n.3 (1993) (listing cases in which courts cite an increased
risk of inadvertently disclosing privileged documents).
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that communications protected by the attorney-client privilege4 may
be inadvertently disclosed.' Privileged communications may also be
4. As a general rule, information protected by the attorney-client privilege is
excluded from the realm of discoverable information. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). To
aid in the identification of those communications protected by the privilege, the
privilege is usually described in the following manner:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950); see also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2017 (1970) (discussing the attorney-client privilege).
See generally 4 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.01[38]
(2d ed. 1994) (outlining discovery scope and its limits); 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (1961) (dis-
cussing general principles and statutory definitions of the attorney-client privilege).
5. The following litany of cases illustrates the frequency with which privileged
communications are inadvertently produced: In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 977
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (revealing that only one privileged memorandum was produced out
of many documents); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, 742 F. Supp. at 643 (disclosing that of
the more than 100,000 pages produced during a document production, four pages
contained privileged information); Bud Antle, 131 F.R.D. at 181 (stating that
plaintiff's counsel reviewed approximately 6000 documents in preparation for
defendant's inspection, between 2500 and 3000 pages of non-privileged documents
were made available for review, and only one privileged document was disclosed);
Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (finding that of the 90,000 documents examined and of the 14,000
documents produced, only one privileged letter was produced); Monarch Cement Co.
v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (revealing that from
the more than 9000 pages of documents produced only eight pages of privileged
material was produced), summary judgment granted, No. 88-2431-V, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18669 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133
F.R.D. 171, 172 (D. Kan. 1989) (identifying three privileged documents produced in
a document production totalling 500,000 pages); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No.
CIV.A.88-5257, 1989 WL 9354, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1989) (discussing a situation
in which 11 privileged documents were produced in a document request requiring the
production of numerous documents); International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip.
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disclosed to an adversary under more questionable circumstances:
specifically, the intentional, strategic disclosure of privileged
information favorable to the disclosing party's position.
In any case involving the disclosure of privileged information,
the court must initially decide whether the privilege is waived. To
resolve this threshold issue courts apply one of the three waiver
tests.' If a court decides that the disclosure waives the attorney-
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 446 (D. Mass. 1988) (revealing that when the lawyers
perused 500,000 documents in response to the document request, 20 privileged
documents were included in those selected for production); Kansas-Nebraska Natural
Gas, 109 F.R.D. at 21 (finding only one privileged document included in the more
than "75,000 documents.., produced in response to Marathon's first request for the
production of documents"); In re Consolidated Litig. Concerning Int'l. Harvester's
Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (demonstrating
that the production of 100,000 documents included more than one privileged
document); Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 117 F.R.D. 119, 121 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (recognizing that Baxter included one privileged document in the eight boxes
of documents produced); Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 104 (stating that out of
30,000 pages of documents reviewed, approximately 16,000 pages were produced and
twenty-two of these documents were privileged); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.,
531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (highlighting that defendant included four
privileged letters in the production of materials from 28 business files).
6. The three tests used to determine this preliminary issue are the lenient test, the
strict test, and the middle test. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 954-55
(restating the lenient test); Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Assocs., 470 F.
Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (formulating the strict test); Bud Antle, 131
F.R.D. at 182-84 (discussing the middle test). See generally Harding, supra note 3,
at 469-74 (highlighting the problems that arise from having three different approaches
which deal with the issue of whether the inadvertent production of a privileged
document waives the attorney-client privilege).
The lenient test states that the "mere inadvertent production [of privileged
documents] does not waive the [attorney-client] privilege." Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp.
at 954; see also Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 208 (stating that the court could find
no cases in which unintentional or inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document
resulted in waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to undisclosed documents
concerning the same subject matter).
Under the strict test, the waiver occurs automatically because the "disclosure of
documents protected by the attorney-client privilege ... operates as a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege [even] as to any documents disclosed by 'inadvertence."'
International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 450 (footnote omitted).
The middle test does not automatically permit or prevent the waiver of the
privilege. BudAntle, 131 F.R.D. at 183; see, e.g., Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 208
(determining that a party waived its privilege because it failed to take precautions or
rectify the error after producing the document). Instead the following five factors are
analyzed to decide whether the privilege is waived:
19951
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client privilege,7 then it must address a second, critical issue-the
proper scope, or extent, of the waiver.' Currently, courts use four
standards to determine the appropriate scope of the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. These standards are as follows: (1) the
scope of the waiver only extends to the specific document(s)
produced;9 (2) the scope of the waiver encompasses all privileged
1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken during the document produc-
tion;
2) the time taken to fix the error;
3) the scope of the document Tequest;
4) the extent of the document request; and
5) fairness.
Bud Antle, 131 F.R.D. at 183.
7. See, e.g., Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483 (privilege waived); Ray v.
Cutter Lab. Div. of Miles, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (waiving the
privilege); Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 209 (waiving the privilege); Parkway Gallery
Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (waiving the privilege), aff'd, 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989); In re
Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. at 1154 (waiving the privilege); Liggett Group, Inc. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 209 (M.D.N.C. 1986)
(waiving the privilege); Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (waiving the privilege); Ranney-Brown Distrib. v. E.T. Barwick,
75 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (waiving the privilege).
8. See In Re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980 (stating that after determining that a
waiver occurred, the court must proceed to decide the "question as to the scope of the
waiver"); WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2327 (urging that implied intention, fairness, and
consistency should be weighed in determining the extent of waiver by implication so
that one cannot disclose "as much as he pleases" and then "withhold the remainder");
Robert J. Franco & Michael E. Prangle, The Inadvertent Waiver of Privilege, 26
TORTS & INS. L.J. 637, 658-61 (1991) (asserting that waiver extends to the same
subject matter of privileged attorney-client communications made prior to disclosure,
so that a party may not "exploit selective disclosures for tactical advantage"); see also
Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
82 MICH. L. REv. 598, 603 n.26 (1983) (discussing the different possibilities for the
extent of waiver by implication, including a waiver for all privileged documents and
a waiver limited to those documents inadvertently disclosed). See generally Harding,
supra note 3, at 468 n.8 (summarizing the scope of the standards courts currently use).
This issue does not exist in jurisdictions applying the lenient test, see supra note
6 (describing the lenient test), because a waiver of the privilege never occurs and,
therefore, the scope-of-the-waiver issue is moot.
9. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178, 182 (D.
Mass. 1991); Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52 ; International Digital, 120 F.R.D.
at 450.
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materials on the same subject matter as the produced documents;1
(3) the scope of the waiver includes all privileged documents relating
to the same subject matter as the produced document(s); and (4)
the scope of the waiver requires the production of all other privi-
leged documents on the same general subject matter.' 2
This Article analyzes how courts use these four standards to
resolve the scope-of-the-waiver issue and proposes new rules that
courts should prospectively apply when selecting the appropriate
scope-of-the-waiver standard. Parts II through V of this Article
discuss the standards presently in use. This discussion includes a
brief description of the scope-of-the-waiver test being assessed,
followed by an examination of the factors that are key to the
selection of that standard. These considerations include classifying
the disclosure as inadvertent or voluntary, determining whether the
disclosing party has engaged in selective disclosure, assessing
whether the disclosure negatively impacts the integrity of the
litigation process, and examining whether the consequences of the
disclosure are unfair to the nondisclosing party. This Article also
explores the administrative aspects of each standard and highlights
the inherent administrative burdens experienced by courts in
implementing some of the standards. The Article then assesses each
standard by focusing on how the standard furthers several important
and competing values: protecting the attorney-client privilege;
fostering the liberal discovery policy of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; ensuring fairness to the litigants; and deterring substan-
dard and spurious behavior by attorneys, as measured by the penalty
imposed on the disclosing party through the court's selection of a
particular standard. Part VI compares the standards, presents a
proposal for a revised approach for courts to use when resolving the
scope-of-the-waiver question, and advises attorneys about how to
10. Standard Chartered Bank v. Ayala Int'l Holdings, 111 F.R.D. 76, 85
(S.D.N.Y 1986) ("It is true that the voluntary production of a privileged document
effects a waiver of the privilege as to all other privileged communications concerning
the same subject matter.") (emphasis added); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Goldman, Sachs, & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F.
Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Ill. 1976); see also Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 484
(discussing different views on the scope of the waiver); 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note
4, 26.01138] (2d ed. 1994) (outlining discovery scope and its limits).
11. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980-81.
12. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1990).
1995] 373
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avoid the imposition of the broader scope-of-the-waiver standards.
The Conclusion provides a brief summary of the highlights pertain-
ing to the extent of the waiver issue.
II. The Specific Document Standard
A. Description of the Scope of the Waiver
The specific document standard is one of the four scope-of-the-
waiver standards used by courts. This standard limits the extent of
the waiver of the attorney-client privilege to the specific privileged
communications disclosed.13 Thus, it is a narrow standard because
it prevents the nondisclosing party from obtaining access to addi-
tional privileged material.
B. Factors Influencing the Selection of this Standard
Several key factors influence a court's decision to select the
specific document standard. These factors include whether the
disclosure is classified as inadvertent or voluntary and whether the
circumstances surrounding the disclosure provide evidence that the
disclosing party engaged in behavior that mocks the litigation process
and is inherently unfair to the nondisclosing party.
1. Classification of the Disclosure.-Perhaps the single most
important factor the court considers is how to categorize the
disclosure of the privileged material. If the court concludes that the
disclosure of the privileged material was inadvertent, 4 rather than
13. See Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52 (holding that in a proper case of
inadvertent disclosure, the waiver should cover only the specific document in issue);
see also Turner & Newall, 137 F.R.D. at 182-83 (limiting the scope of the waiver to
the specific documents disclosed); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver
Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207-09 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that waiver of the
attorney-client privilege was limited to the specific letter disclosed).
14. See International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D.
445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988) (stating that waiver was limited to "any documents
disclosed by 'inadvertence"').
[Vol. 14:367
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intentional or voluntary, then the court is very likely to select this
narrow standard.15
The critical role played by classifying the disclosure as inadver-
tent is aptly illustrated in Parkway Gallery,6 a case in which
several privileged documents were included with other nonprivileged
documents in a large document production.7 While the court
found that the disclosure of the privileged items waived the attorney-
client privilege, 8 it refused to grant plaintiffs' request that "the
[scope of the] waiver should cover all communications of the same
subject matter." 9 Instead, relying upon the fact that the disclosure
was inadvertent, the court selected the narrower specific document
standard.' In doing so, the court noted the pivotal role inadvertent
disclosure plays in the decision to select the narrowest scope-of-the-
waiver standard:
When a document is inadvertently produced it necessarily loses its actual
confidentiality and, therefore, only in special cases should a court attempt
to somehow resurrect the secret by a court order limiting further exposure.
The same is not true for related but still confidential matters. A ruling of
15. See, e.g., Turner & Newall, 137 F.R.D. at 182 (holding that while the
plaintiff waived any privilege as to documents inadvertently disclosed, the waiver did
not extend beyond the documents actually disclosed); Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at
207-08 (explaining that while voluntary disclosure waives the privilege as to related
documents, "the court could find no cases where unintentional or inadvertent
disclosure of a privileged document resulted in the wholesale waiver of the attorney-
client privilege as to undisclosed documents concerning the same subject matter");
International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 450 (holding that inadvertent disclosure operates
as a waiver of the privilege "as to any documents disclosed"); Parkway Gallery, 116
F.R.D. at 52 (holding that in a case of inadvertent disclosure, waiver should cover
only the specific documents in issue, "unless it is obvious that a party is attempting
to gain an advantage or make offensive or unfair use of the disclosure"); First Wis.
Mortgage v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 172-75 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding that
defendant's inadvertent disclosure of certain documents for which attorney-client
privilege was claimed did not result in waiver); see also Champion Int'l Corp. v.
International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that
inadvertent disclosure of a minimal amount of privileged material does not constitute
a waiver of other privileged material).
16. Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
17. Id. at 48.
18. Id. at 51-52.
19. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of the same-subject-
matter standard, see infra Part m.
20. Parkivay Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52.
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no waiver will maintain confidentiality which is the main purpose of the
privilege. Therefore, a party attempting to show inadvertent disclosure
faces a reduced standard when the issue is whether communications related
to the disclosed document should be deemed waived as well. The general
rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific communication but also
the subject matter of it in other communications is not appropriate in the
case of inadvertent disclosure . . . In a proper case of inadvertent
disclosure, the waiver should cover only the specific document in issue.2'
Additional support for the significance of this factor is found in
Champion International Corp.' In that case, a party, responding
to a massive request for the production of documents, included a few
privileged communications with the nonprivileged materials pro-
duced.' As a result of this disclosure, the defendant contended
that the plaintiff should be compelled to produce additional privi-
leged information.24 The court, however, rejected defendant's
contention.' It not only refused to hold that the plaintiff waived
the attorney-client privilege, but also, in dicta, the court expressed
its view that even if the privilege had been waived, the scope of the
waiver should be limited to the specific documents disclosed because
the documents were inadvertently revealed. 6 Thus, the initial step
of categorizing the disclosure, and the resulting waiver, as inadver-
tent occupies a powerful and influential position in the decision to
select the specific document standard.
Although inadvertence alone might suffice to persuade a court
to select the specific document standard, inadvertence coupled with
a document production possessing certain compelling attributes can
improve a litigant's chances of having the court select the document-
only standard. The attributes that appear to be most influential are
as follows: (1) if responding to the document request required
producing a substantial number of documents; and (2) if relatively
few privileged documents were inadvertently included in the large
21. Id. at 52 (citations omitted); cf. Standard Chartered Bank v. Ayala Int'l
Holdings, 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that inadvertent disclosure
does not automatically effect a waiver).
22. Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1333
(N.D. Ga. 1980).






production.27 The impact these attributes can have on the decision
to select this standard is evident in the Parkway Gallery case. In
Parkway Gallery, the producing party copied 12,000 pages of
discoverable material in response to its opponent's request for the
production of documents.28 The 12,000 pages included twenty
documents protected by the attorney-client privilege.29 The court
held that the inclusion of these protected documents in the response
waived the attorney-client privilege." The court, however, selected
the narrower specific document standard because the disclosure of
the privileged documents was inadvertent3' and relatively few
privileged documents were produced in what was characterized as a
massive document production.32
Bud Antle33 provides another example of how combining the
inadvertent disclosure component with the magnitude of the
document production component can lead to a successful argument
that the specific document standard is the appropriate measure. In
Bud Antle, "[b]etween 2500 and 3000 pages of nonprivileged
documents were made available for [the nondisclosing party's]
review."'34 One privileged letter was unintentionally included in the
27. Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that these two factors were
important and instrumental in selecting the specific document standard); see also
Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204,207-
08 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (finding no cases in which unintentional or inadvertent disclosure
of a privileged document resulted in a broad waiver of the attorney-client privilege);
International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 447-48 (D.
Mass. 1988) (stating that 20 privileged documents were unintentionally included in a
document request that resulted in the production of 90 cases of documents); Champion
Int'l, 486 F. Supp. at 1333 (revealing that a minimal amount of privileged material
was disclosed during "the course of exhaustive discovery").
28. Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 49.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 52.
31. Id.
32. Id. These same factors were relied upon in another case in which a court
adopted the specific document standard in a situation when the producing party
produced 90 cases of documents, excluding 2600 documents withheld on the grounds
of privilege, and accidentally produced 20 privileged documents. International Digital
Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 446-48 (D. Mass. 1988).
33. Bud Antle, Inc., v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
34. Id. at 181.
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
documents reviewed by the requesting party.35 Although the Bud
Antle court held that the privilege was waived because a privileged
document was disclosed, it limited the scope of the waiver to that
specific document. 6  While the court did not expressly state its
rationales supporting the selection of this standard, it is fair to
surmise that the court's references to the enormity of the document
production and the fact that only one privileged item was produced
creates a reasonable inference that the size of the document produc-
tion, in relation to the one privileged document produced, was a
critical factor in the court's scope-of-the-waiver assessment. In
short, when deciding this issue, it appears that courts may determine
that the specific document standard is appropriate if the document
production is sufficiently large and relatively few privileged
communications are inadvertently disclosed.37
(a) The Integrity of the Litigation Process.-Although a
conclusion of inadvertent disclosure is necessary to trigger the
application of the narrowest standard, inadvertence alone or
inadvertence and compelling production circumstances might
ultimately be insufficient to guarantee the application of the docu-
ment-only standard. For example, a court might decide to opt for
a broader waiver standard based on its perception of the actions
taken by the disclosing party during the course of the document
production. Accordingly, if a court concludes that, although
inadvertent, the disclosing party's actions are indicative of a failure
to fulfill the obligation to ensure the integrity of the litigation
process, then the court would be more likely to refrain from
35. Id.
36. Id. at 183-84.
37. First Wisconsin presents a situation in which this factor also was considered
and played a pivotal role in a court's selection of this limited measure. First Wis.
Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160 (E.D. Wis. 1980). In this case,
the producing party produced in "excess of 150,000 pages of documents." Id. at 169.
Twenty-one privileged documents were unintentionally included with the 150,000
pages. Because privileged communications had been disclosed, the nonproducing
party requested that the court order the producing party to surrender all additional
privileged materials that "relate to the same subject matter" as those initially
produced. Id. at 172-73. In refusing to grant this request, the enormity of the
document production coupled with the inclusion of relatively few privileged documents
seems to have influenced the court's decision that the specific document standard was
the appropriate standard to apply. Id. at 169.
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applying the specific document standard, notwithstanding that the
disclosure was, in fact, inadvertent.38 One example of how this
consideration might effect the application of the specific document
standard is found in Parkway Gallery.39  In that case, the
nondisclosing party argued that the "defendant was trying to
overwhelm them by using a document dump," which warranted the
imposition of a standard broader than the specific document
standard. 4 The court, however, rejected the nondisclosing party's
contention and found that the disclosure of the privileged material
was not indicative of any effort to abuse the discovery process.4
In doing so, the court specifically noted that the defendant's decision
to "produc[e] virtually all [of] its files for inspection was not a tactic
designed to overwhelm plaintiffs but rather serves to reduce
discovery disputes . "..."42 Therefore, something more than a
mere inadvertent disclosure might be necessary for a court to adopt
the narrowest scope-of-the-waiver standard: The disclosing party
must refrain from taking any actions that indicate a lack of respect
for the litigation process and the discovery system.
Additional acceptance of this modification of the role played by
disclosure due to inadvertence and the resulting impact on the
selection of the specific document standard is evident in Golden
Valley.43 In that case, the court noted that, with respect to the
production and retention of documents involved in the case, "counsel
have been scrupulous in their filings to reflect the protective nature
38. In Parkway Gallery, the court noted that "unless it is obvious a party is
attempting to gain an advantage or make offensive or unfair use of the disclosure,"
the inadvertent disclosure of documents supports the application of the specific
document standard. Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House
Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987); see also First Wisconsin, 86
F.R.D. at 174 (adopting the specific document standard, partially because the
disclosing party did not gain any advantage from the inadvertent disclosure of
privileged documents).
39. Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 50-51.
43. Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc., v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D.
204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
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of the information submitted."' The court's statement indicates
that the disclosing party's inadvertent disclosure did not reflect a
disregard for the adjudication process and, consequently, the court
opted not to adopt the opponent's suggestion to impose a broad
standard but instead determined that the situation warranted the use
of the narrow specific document standard. Thus, the inadvertent
disclosure of protected material may ultimately be insufficient to
support the application of the specific document standard if the court
concludes that the disclosing party has little or no respect for the
litigation process.
(b) Fairness to the Litigants.-Although classifying the
disclosure as inadvertent is generally a variable needed to obtain the
limited specific document standard, it remains possible that, despite
refusing to definitively classify the disclosure as inadvertent, a court
might still decide that the specific document standard is appropriate.
For example, some courts have not expressly designated the
disclosure as inadvertent or voluntary, but nonetheless selected the
specific document standard when addressing the scope-of-the-waiver
issue.' 5 In other instances, such as International Digital Sys-
tems, 46 the court uses the specific document standard, but the
classification of the disclosure remains ambiguous. In International
Digital, the court apparently treated the situation as one involving a
voluntary disclosure, but adopted terminology associated with
inadvertently disclosed privileged material.47 One interpretation of
this decision is that the court purposefully used obtuse language in
its discussion of the classification of the waiver because it wanted the
disclosure issue to remain ambiguous. Another interpretation is that
the court developed a definition of "inadvertent" that is akin to"voluntary." Regardless of which view is adopted, it is undisputed
that the court left the classification of the waiver unresolved.
44. Id. at 207; see also Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F.
Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (stating that counsel was cooperative in an"exhaustive" discovery situation).
45. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178, 182-83
(D. Mass. 1991) (holding that plaintiff waived any privilege to disclosed information,
without specifying whether the waiver was inadvertent or unintentional).
46. International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,
449 (D. Mass. 1988).
47. Id. at 448-50.
380 [Vol. 14:367
ATTORNEY-CLIENT WAIVER
Nonetheless, the court selected the specific document standard for a
situation that the court apparently viewed as being tantamount to a
voluntary disclosure situation.4 8 Unfortunately, courts that deviate
from the strict inadvertent-versus-voluntary disclosure factor and
conclude that the specific document standard is appropriate typically
fail to provide detailed rationales for these decisions. However, it
appears that notions of fairness and justice can be the prime
motivators for a court opting to select the specific document standard
when the disclosure has not been definitively defined as inadver-
tent.49
2. The Selective Disclosure Factor.-As previously noted, the
decision to select this narrow standard does not solely rest on
whether the court opts to classify the disclosure as inadvertent, but
is also tied to judicial concerns that the disclosure not reflect an
effort to compromise the integrity of the litigation process and,
specifically, the discovery process. In addition, the decision to
select this standard may reflect a court's interest in ensuring that the
proceedings are fair to the litigants. Typically, these dual concerns
are evident in disclosure situations in which it is clear that the
disclosing party has engaged in selective disclosure.5" Selective
disclosure occurs if a party discloses favorable privileged material
48. Id. at 450.
49. Id.; see also Bud Antle, Inc., v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 184
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that fairness demands that the disclosing party waived the
attorney-client privilege regardless of whether disclosure was inadvertent).
50. "Truth-garbling" is an alternative term for this practice. The phrase "truth-
garbling" was coined because the resolution of a legal dispute requires a determination
of the "truth." The "truth" has a greater risk of being "garbled" if parties, by
alleging inadvertent disclosure, are able to decide which information will be available
to be considered by those involved in the resolution of the matter. See Golden Valley
Microwave Foods, Inc., v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207 (N.D. Ind.
1980) (discussing indices that the court can consider to determine whether a disclosure
is truly inadvertent); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1161 (D.S.C. 1974) (providing a definition of selective disclosure); International Tel.
& Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (holding that
a party could not insist upon the protection of the privilege for damaging communica-
tions while disclosing other selected communications because such conduct was self-
serving). See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1986) (arguing that waiver should be
dependent on whether the party made selective use of privileged material to "garble"
the truth).
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on a particular issue and subsequently attempts to use the attorney-
client privilege as "a shield" in order to avoid disclosing unfavorable
privileged material on the same issue.51 Thus, a court will more
likely forego applying the narrowest standard as the scope of the
waiver if the disclosing party engaged in acts disruptive to the
discovery and litigation processes.
Selective disclosure is unacceptable to the courts because it
would provide the producing party with the power to decide which
privileged communications it wants to disclose and which it wants to
retain. Consequently, the disclosing party would be in a better
position to unilaterally dictate the course of the litigation to some
degree, which is in direct contravention with the adversarial posture
of present day litigation. Perhaps more importantly, selective
disclosure indicates that the court has before it a litigant who refuses
to "play by the rules" and whose actions express little, if any,
interest in achieving the broader goal of maintaining the integrity of
the adjudication process. Thus, if the disclosing party did strategi-
cally disclose favorable documents and the court applies the specific
document standard, then the court would, in essence, be rewarding
the disclosing party for its malfeasance by exhibiting behavior that
is contrary to upholding the integrity of the litigation process.
Selective disclosure also allows one party to have an unfair use
of the protected material by allowing it to gain an advantage over the
51. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D.76,
85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that a party cannot select which privileged documents it
will voluntarily produce); see also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel.
Co, 26 F. 55, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) (stating that a party cannot disclose fragments
of information and avoid disclosing other parts by claiming attorney-client privilege).
Typically, if it appears that the party deliberately and consciously decided to
produce certain privileged materials, and subsequently refused to disclose other
privileged documents in an effort to gain an advantage, then courts are more likely to
refuse to apply the limited specific-document-waiver standard. However, it is not
clear what burden of proof the court would require in order to establish that the
disclosing party had engaged in selective disclosure. In one case, the court established
a fairly stringent burden of proof standard by holding that "it [must appear] obvious
a party is attempting to... make offensive or unfair use of the disclosure." Parkway
Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D.46,
52 (M.D.N.C. 1987). Since the Parkway Gallery court used the specific document
measure, it is fair to surmise that the court did not find it "obvious" that the disclosing
party was involved in strategically disclosing privileged communications.
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nondisclosing party.52 The Duplan Corp. court elucidated this
point when it noted that "[w]here a party has produced nonincrimi-
nating privileged attorney-client documents and withheld other
incriminating documents, an adversary may rightfully assert the
doctrine of subject matter waiver."53 Thus, when a court confronts
a situation that has evidence of selective disclosure activity, in order
to equalize the parties' positions or to neutralize the advantage
gained by the disclosing party, the court might be more likely to
refrain from selecting the specific document standard.
Equally important is that the issue pertaining to the classification
of the disclosure as inadvertent or intentional is inherent in situations
when there is evidence of selective disclosure. For example, in
some situations it might be difficult to determine whether the
disclosure was inadvertent or voluntary and the court, in selecting a
scope-of-the-waiver standard, may decide that regardless of whether
the disclosure occurred54 inadvertently or intentionally, the produc-
tion of favorable privileged material and the disclosing party's
subsequent request for the application of the specific document
standard suggests that selective disclosure occurred and, thus, the
situation does not support the use of the narrower specific document
standard.55
52. See Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52 (stating that a general waiver of the
attorney-client privilege is not appropriate in the case of inadvertent disclosure unless
it is obvious that a party is attempting to make unfair use of the disclosure).
53. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1191 (D.S.C.
1974). The Parkway Gallery court recognized the relationships among selective
disclosure, unfairness to the nondisclosing party, and the selection of the specific
document standard: "The general rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific
communication but also the subject matter of it in other communications is not
appropriate in the case of inadvertent disclosure, unless it is obvious a party is
attempting to gain an advantage." Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52; cf. First Wis.
Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174 (E.D. Wis 1980) (stating
that the disclosure was not unfair because the disclosing party did not benefit from the
disclosure; thus, the narrower specific document standard was selected).
54. See Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at207 (accepting description of the disclosure
as truly inadvertent and noting that there was not "a sly attempt to ... use truth
garbling tactics").
55. Cf. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12,
21 (D. Neb. 1983) (stating that mere inadvertent production does not automatically
waive the privilege); Western Union, 26 F.2d at 56-57 (finding intentional disclosure
waived the privilege).
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In sum, several factors may be relevant to determining whether
the specific document standard is applicable. After a court resolves
that issue, it must then delve into the administration of the standard.
C. Administering the Specific Document Standard
The mechanics of the specific document standard are simple.
Once there is a disclosure of protected communications and the court
finds waiver of the attorney-client privilege, then the waiver extends
only to the specific privileged information disclosed. Thus, as
previously noted, this standard is a narrow and limited scope-of-the-
waiver measure.
This standard's simple mechanics enhances the ease with which
it can be administered. As a result, it is unlikely that courts will
encounter any difficulty in determining which communications have
lost their protection due to the waiver of the attorney-client privilege
because the scope of the waiver does not extend beyond the
privileged materials that were actually produced to the opponent.
Therefore, the court's primary administrative task is to determine
which privileged materials were initially disclosed and to issue an
order allowing the nondisclosing party to retain those communica-
tions.
D. The Standard's Policy Considerations
Several critical policy considerations influence the selection of
a scope-of-the-waiver measure. The policies at stake are (1) the
preservation of the attorney-client privilege; (2) the implementation
of the liberalized discovery policy; and (3) the imposition of a
penalty to deter substandard litigation practices.
The limited specific document standard endorses the attorney-
client privilege56 more than it does the liberal discovery policy.5 7
56. The "purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote freedom of
consultation between client and legal advisors without apprehension of subsequent
compelled legal disclosure." International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co. of
Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that the purpose of the privilege is "to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration
of justice"); In Re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explaining that
the "raison d'etre of the hallowed attorney-client privilege" is to protect, and thereby
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It does so because its narrow scope ensures that the disclosing party
will have to surrender fewer privileged materials. Consequently, a
court can salvage the attorney-client privilege to the greatest extent
possible. The general endorsement of this policy is reflected in one
court's observation that "a ruling that no waiver has occurred as to
the nondisclosed documents will maintain the confidentiality which
is the main purpose of the attorney-client privilege."58 Thus, if a
court views the preservation of the attorney-client privilege as the
paramount policy consideration involved in resolving this issue, then
the odds are in the disclosing party's favor that the court will select
the specific document standard because that standard embodies the
importance placed on upholding the attorney-client privilege.
Although this standard's primary emphasis is on preserving the
attorney-client privilege, it does not necessarily follow that this
standard is somehow inconsistent with the objectives of a liberal
discovery policy. In fact, by prohibiting the disclosing party from
regaining dominion over the disclosed privileged material, the court
promulgates the exchange of information-a key purpose of the
liberal discovery policy. Furthermore, the standard fosters the
discovery of information by permitting the nondisclosing party to
retain previously protected documents.
Adopting the specific document standard will necessarily
penalize the disclosing party for disclosing privileged material, since
every scope-of-the-waiver test contains a punitive component.
However, the penalty is minimal because the disclosing party is only
required to relinquish the attorney-client privilege protection for the
encourage, attorney-client communication); Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. Ayala
Int'l Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege is to encourage frank communications between attorneys
and their clients).
57. Discovery has three main purposes: preserving relevant information that may
be unavailable at the time of trial; ascertaining and refining the actual disputed issues;
and enabling parties to obtain information that will lead to evidence admissible at trial.
E.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.1 (2d ed. 1993); FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
58. Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 208 (citing Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc.
v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987));
see also International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,
450 (D. Mass. 1988) (stating that the specific document "rule is most consistent with
the purposes of the [attorney-client] privilege").
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specific documents.59 More than likely, a court's decision to select
this standard is influenced by the belief that, although the careless
attorney must be chastised in some manner, the hapless client should
not be overpenalized. This concern is apparent in the hypothetical
case of a court soundly chastising the responsible attorney for failing
to institute sufficient precautionary procedures, but applying the
relatively protective specific document standard. ° In reaching this
59. A court may hold that the attorney-client privilege is waived and that the
specific document scope-of-the-waiver measure will be used; however, while the
nondisclosing party loses the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege, it still
might be able to seek a protective order to avoid public disclosure of the documents.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
60. Of course, there are alternatives to a court using the specific document
standard to protect a client from its attorney's foibles: The court could impose a
broader scope-of-the-waiver standard and the client could bring a legal malpractice
action against the attorney for disclosing the privileged communication.
While this malpractice alternative is available to the disclosing party, it has
several inherent problems. The most critical problems are associated with the
difficulties in bringing such an action. When the alleged act of negligence consists of
the inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents that resulted in the application of
a particular waiver test, the client or claimant is likely to have difficulty establishing
three of the malpractice elements. First, it will be difficult for the client to show that
the attorney breached the duty to use reasonable care, which has been summarized as
follows:
His duty to his client requires an attorney to exercise the knowledge,
skill, and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the
legal profession similarly situated. He is not bound to exercise extraordi-
nary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having
reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Within this
standard, he will be protected so long as he acts honestly and in good faith.
7 AM. JuR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 199 (1980) (footnotes omitted). Under such a
definition, an attorney-defendant may be able to convince a jury that the duty was not
breached despite the imposition of a particular waiver standard.
Second, even if a breach of duty can be shown, the client must shoulder an
onerous burden to establish "but for" causation, especially because the alleged
negligent act is the production of privileged materials that resulted in the application
of a particular scope-of-the-waiver standard. Clients will essentially have to relitigate
the underlying action as though the disclosure had never taken place and the scope-of-
the-waiver standard had not been imposed, and then prove that, if the privileged
materials had not been discovered, then the outcome would have been favorable to
them.
Third, proximate cause will be difficult to establish. Many factors influence a
jury's verdict or encourage the parties to reach a settlement; thus the attorney-
defendant could argue that any number of these factors caused the client's loss. The
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outcome, the court may balance its dissatisfaction with the attorney's
substandard professional actions against the punitive impact of the
specific document standard on the client. The punitive facet is also
minimized because it is unlikely that the surrender of the specific
documents will significantly impact the course of the parties'
dispute: The disclosed documents are unlikely to be "smoking guns"
that might affect settlement options and litigation strategy.
The magnitude of the punitive facet of the specific document
standard also relates to risk-benefit considerations. The specific
document scope-of-the-waiver test enables the disclosing party to
reap more benefits because a litigant who discloses privileged
materials only runs the risk6 of forfeiting the protection in those
specific communications. Thus, the party waiving the privilege
relinquishes solely the right to continue shielding particular privi-
leged communications and does not risk the disclosure of additional
documents. Unfortunately, this standard only slightly deters the
negligent production of documents by lawyers, who need to be
careful not to disclose confidential communications in the atypical
situation when the production includes a "smoking gun" adverse to
the disclosing party's position. Of course, such documents should
receive the closest scrutiny before production and are, accordingly,
less likely to be inadvertently disclosed. If such a damaging
disclosure were to occur, however, there is a greater possibility of
negatively affecting the terms of a settlement as well as any strategic
advantages the disclosing party had before the disclosure. Attorneys
may also fear that the court might misinterpret an advantageous
opponent's investigation, the skill of the opponent's attorney, or the client's own
failures on the witness stand could be cited as more direct causes of the client's
disappointment than the scope-of-the-waiver standard applied because of the attorney's
negligent disclosure.
Aside from the difficulty inherent in establishing the requisite elements, another
flaw of the malpractice alternative is that the client-claimant will find himself before
the jury in an unenviable position, essentially saying, "I was trying to keep this
information secret but my attorney erred, the court forced me to reveal my secrets,
and I lost." While such "sneakiness" is permissible in the American court system, it
will be unattractive to the jury. The jury may find in favor of the attorney-defendant
on the rationale that the client-claimant was culpable for not voluntarily disclosing the
information in the first place.
61. See Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52 (explaining that the specific
document standard "limits the risk to parties in major discovery cases").
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inadvertent disclosure and compel a broader disclosure of confiden-
tial matters to eliminate the advantage.
E. Conclusion
In sum, the specific document standard is a narrow test that
imposes a minimal penalty on the party who loses the protection of
the attorney-client privilege. It is also easy to administer, because
the court needs to determine only which privileged documents were
disclosed. Because it provides a limited waiver, this standard
conforms to the principles embodied in the attorney-client privilege
doctrine more than to those of the liberalized discovery policy.
Ill. The Same-Subject-Matter Standard
A. Description of the Scope of the Wiver
The same-subject-matter standard is the second of the four
scope-of-the-waiver tests used by courts dealing with confidential
material disclosed through discovery. This standard requires the
disclosing party to surrender all additional privileged documents on
the same subject matter as those privileged documents actually
revealed.62 Many consider this test a relatively narrow measure
because the subsequent compelled disclosure is "limited to [docu-
ments on] that specific subject." 63
62. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76,
85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining that privilege is waived as to all communications on
the same subject matter); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1191 (D.S.C. 1974) (stating that this standard waives the privilege "as to all
communications between the same attorney and the same client on the same subject");
Bierman v. Marcus, 122 F. Supp. 250, 252 (D.N.J. 1954) (stating that the scope of
the waiver in this case extends "to all other communications to the attorney on the
same matter"); In Re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D.N.Y.
1944) (explaining that the waiver encompasses "all the privileged correspondence
between [the client] and its attorney on that specific subject").
63. Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, M.D., 412 F. Supp.286, 289 (N.D. I11.
1976) (noting that this is a narrow standard); see also Perrignon v.Bergen Brunswig
Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (stating that the scope of the waiver
must be "strictly construed" to the same subject matter).
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B. Factors Influencing the Selection of this Standard
Several factors play a major role in influencing a judicial body's
decision to select the same-subject-matter standard: the manner in
which the waiver is classified; a concern for ensuring that the
underlying judicial proceeding is fair to the nondisclosing litigant;
and a desire to encourage litigation practices that are consistent with
upholding the integrity of the litigation process.
1. Classification of the Disclosure.-Perhaps the most important
factor in selecting this standard is how the court classifies the
waiver. Not surprisingly, a court is more likely to select this
broader, although still fairly narrow, scope-of-the-waiver standard
if the disclosure was voluntary, rather than inadvertent. "The
general rule [is] that a [voluntary] disclosure waives not only the
specific communication but also the subject matter of it in other
communications."' Consequently, if the nondisclosing party can
establish that the disclosure was voluntary, then the court is likely
to apply the same-subject-matter standard.
The Perrignon' decision illustrates how voluntariness is one
of "[t]he key"'  variables in the selection of this standard. In
Perrignon, the plaintiffs, at a deposition, attempted to question the
defendants' former in-house counsel about alleged payments made
64. Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52; see Weil v. Investment/Indicators,
Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that "it has
been widely held that voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney
communication constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such communications
on the same subject"); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co.
132 F.R.D. 204, 207-08 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (stating that "[v]oluntary disclosure, as
opposed to inadvertent disclosure,waives the privilege as to remaining documents of
that subject matter"); Standard Chartered Bank, 111 F.R.D. at 85 (explaining that
"the voluntary production of a privileged document effects a waiver of the privilege
as to all other privileged communications concerning the same subject matter");
Duplan, 397 F. Supp. at 1191 (explaining that a voluntary waiver of the attorney-
client privilege results in a same-subject-matter waiver); see also Underwater Storage,
Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C. 1970) (noting the
importance of the voluntariness of the disclosure in the decision as to which scope-of-
the-waiver standard to apply); In Re Associated Gas, 59 F. Supp. at 744 ( deciding
that the same-subject-matter standard was appropriate for the intentional waiver
standard).
65. Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
66. Standard Chartered Bank, 111 F.R.D. at 85.
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by the corporate defendant to a state official.67 The defendants
objected to this line of questioning and the deponent refused to
respond on the basis that the communications were protected by the
attorney-client privilege.6" At a later date, the plaintiffs deposed
the defendant corporation's former president and asked him "about
conversations he had with Nielsen [the former in-house counsel]
concerning payments made by" the corporation to the state offi-
cial. 69 Although the defendants objected to this line of questioning,
claiming the protection of the attorney-client privilege, counsel for
the defendants ultimately permitted the deponent to "describe a
conversation he had with Nielsen concerning payments made" to the
state official.7' Consequently, the plaintiffs moved to compel the
first deponent, who previously had asserted the attorney-client
privilege when refusing to answer the same questions at his initial
deposition, to answer questions regarding his conversations with the
second deponent about the alleged payments.7 The defendants'
objected to this request on the grounds that there was no waiver of
the attorney-client privilege because they registered this precise
objection at the second deponent's deposition.7' The court,
however, disagreed and held that the disclosure of the privileged
communication by the second deponent was voluntary and effectively
waived the privilege so that "defendants cannot now claim the
privilege to prevent [another witness] from answering questions
about these same conversations."I Thus, the voluntary disclosure
of privileged information can provide a court with strong grounds for
adopting the same-subject-matter standard.
Although courts are usually more comfortable applying this
standard in situations involving the voluntary disclosure of protected
communications, an exception can arise if an inadvertent disclosure
was due to the attorney's carelessness or lack of diligence in the
performance of professional duties associated with the disclosure of





72. Perrignon, 77 F.R.D. at 457.
73. Id. at 461.
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the confidential material.74 For example, in one case the attorney
responsible for inadvertently disclosing privileged material was found
to have been careless "on a large scale,"75 so the court proceeded
to impose the same-subject-matter disclosure standard. Thus,
although courts are reluctant to impose a substantial penalty on the
disclosing party if the disclosure resulted from a minimal amount of
carelessness, they will not automatically refuse to apply the same-
subject-matter standard if the attorney's degree of care fails to reach
the minimal, acceptable professional level for the performance of the
task at hand.
2. The Selective Disclosure Factor.-The selective disclosure
factor that is related to voluntary disclosure is another variable that
courts frequently include in the same-subject-matter calculation.
Because courts abhor this practice,76 litigants who utilize selective
disclosure will most likely, at best, encounter the same-subject-
matter standard. Courts are not the least bit hesitant in voicing their
displeasure with this tactic:
A party cannot waive such a privilege partially. He cannot remove the seal
of secrecy from so much of the privileged communication as makes for his
advantage, and insist that it shall not be removed as to so much as makes
to the advantage of his adversary, or may neutralize the effect of such as
has been introduced.'
The Perrignon78 case, which was discussed above,79 also
provides a discussion of the merit of selecting the same-subject-
matter standard in selective disclosure situations. In Perrignon, the
court ultimately acknowledged that "[u]nder these circumstances
74. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1191 (D.S.C.
1975); cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178, 182-83 (D.
Mass. 1991) (determining that an attorney's carelessness was not of the magnitude that
warranted the imposition of the same-subject-matter standard).
75. Duplan, 397 F. Supp. at 1191.
76. Displeasure with this activity was noted by the Standard Chartered Bank
court in the following manner: "[We] cannot permit a party to selectively choose to
produce only those communications which may be favorable to him and withhold on
grounds of privilege others which may be favorable to his adversary." Standard Char-
tered Bank, PLC, v. Ayala Int'l Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
77. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1885).
78. Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
79. Supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
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defendants had much to gain by allowing Abrams to answer
plaintiffs' questions so long as they could preserve [defendants']
privilege so as to keep Nielsen from having to give his version of the
same conversation." 0 In fact, the court expressly and accurately
recognized defendants' actions as a tactical decision to strategically
select certain privileged information for disclosure:
The instant case is more analogous to a situation where the holder of a
privilege lets in part of a privileged communication and then seeks to keep
the remainder of the communication out.... [A] party may not insist on
the protection of the attorney-client privilege for damaging communications
while disclosing other selected communications because they are self-
serving.81
Thus, the court's decision that the defendants' actions suggested that
they engaged in selective disclosure warranted the application of the
same-subject-matter standard.'s
Displeasure with selective disclosure is also present in Western
Union Telegraph Co. 3 In that case, a party seeking a preliminary
injunction utilized what the court considered to be dilatory "truth-
garbling" tactics. 4 In denouncing the party's actions and finding
that the same-subject-matter scope-of-the-waiver standard was
appropriate, the court made the following observation: "The
question, then, is whether the complainant can [seek] shelter behind
its privilege . . . when it has itself produced fragmentary parts of
them, and sought to use them as a weapon against the defendant." 5
In each of these cases, the court reached the sensible conclusion that
for parties engaging in selective disclosure, considerations of fairness
and deterrence require the selection and implementation of the same-
subject-matter standard.
80. Perrignon, 77 F.R.D. at 461.
81. Id. (citing and quoting Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp.
926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, v. Ayala Int'l
Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
82. Perrignon, 77 F.R.D. at 460-62.






3. Fairness to the Litigants and Respect for the Litigation
Process.-A consideration that is related to the strategic disclosure
factor is whether the disclosure of the privileged communications
might violate notions of fairness to the nondisclosing opponent or
undermine the integrity of the litigation process, particularly the
discovery process. These dual concerns are interrelated because a
party engaging in the strategic disclosure of privileged material
necessarily reveals its minimal respect for the fair use of the
mechanism used to adjudicate the parties' dispute.
If the disclosure of the privileged materials confers a benefit on
the disclosing party and thereby creates unfairness for a litigant, then
courts are more receptive to using the same subject standard86 as a
tool for neutralizing the disclosing party's advantage. One court has
described the impact of the fairness concern: "It is true that the
voluntary production of a privileged document effects a waiver of
the privilege as to all other privileged communications concerning
the same subject matter. This is so because fairness . . . cannot
permit a party to selectively choose [documents].")7
Concerns for fairness to the nondisclosing party considered in
the application of this standard also manifest the belief that if the
disclosure is unfair to the nondisclosing party, then the nondisclosing
party holds something that is akin to a right to this specific remedy:
Namely, the imposition of the same-subject-matter standard.88 As
86. Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that same-subject-matter standard
can be appropriate if the disclosure is unfair to the nondisclosing party); Standard
Chartered Bank, PLC, v. Ayala Int'l Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (also emphasizing fairness); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 486 F.
Supp. 1329, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (noting the role that fairness to the nondisclosing
party plays in the decision to apply the same-subject-matter standard); Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1191 (D.S.C. 1975) (noting that
concerns for fairness to the nondisclosing party can justify imposing the same-subject-
matter scope-of-the-waiver standard); Western Union, 26 F. at 57 (stating that
disclosing party cannot have partial waiver at the expense of nondisclosing party); see
also Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc., v. Weaver Popcorn Co., Inc., 132
F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (determining that disclosing party cannot use
waiver to gain an advantage); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp.
926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (noting that fairness is an important consideration in
evaluating the issue of waiver).
87. Standard Chartered Bank, 111 F.R.D. at 85.
88. Id.
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a court has written, "Where a party has produced nonincriminating
privileged attorney-client documents and withheld other incriminating
documents, an adversary may rightfully assert the doctrine of subject
matter waiver."8 9 Another court noted that it would be patently
unfair to the nondisclosing party if the disclosing party could benefit
from disclosed privileged material and avoid the imposition of the
broader, same-subject-matter standard.'
There is also a relationship between the selection of this
standard and the court's perception of how, if at all, the disclosing
party's actions undermine or jeopardize the respect that should be
accorded to the litigation process. This variable is infrequently
given as a rationale for selecting the same-subject-matter standard.
Nonetheless, it is evident that courts implicitly include this variable
in the calculations they make when determining whether the same-
subject-matter standard is appropriate. For example, the Standard
Chartered Bank court noted in dicta that if the circumstances of the
disclosure threatened the integrity of the litigation system in some
manner, then the court would be justified in applying the same-
subject-matter standard.91 As a further example, the harsh tone
adopted by the Western Union court in describing the disclosing
party's actions that warranted selecting the same-subject-matter
standard makes it clear that those actions compromised the integrity
of the adjudication process.' As a final example, the Bierman
court apparently was suspicious about the truthfulness or accuracy
of the disclosing party's assertions that the attorney-client privilege
was applicable.' The integrity of the litigation process is, of
course, dependent on good-faith assertions of the privilege. The
court ruled that the same-subject-matter waiver was the appropriate
standard because "most of the claims of privilege seem specious and
dilatory."'94 Thus, if the circumstances of the disclosure, such as
false assertions of the validity of the attorney-client privilege,
suggest that the disclosing party acted in a manner that undermines
89. Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1191.
90. Champion Int'l, 486 F. Supp. at 1332.
91. Standard Chartered Bank, 111 F.R.D. at 85.
92. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 55-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1885).




the integrity of the litigation process, the court might adopt the
same-subject-matter standard.
C. Administering the Same-Subject-Matter Standard
The mechanics of this standard first require the court to define
the precise subject matter of the specific documents disclosed.
Then, following an in camera review of the confidential materials,
the court must compel disclosure of additional privileged information
that comports with that definition or, alternatively, the disclosing
party can voluntarily relinquish the pertinent documents. These
tasks appear simple, almost ministerial. However, attempting to
define the subject matter of the disclosed privileged matter is
frequently a key administrative difficulty. Thus, determining the
precise parameters of the subject matter of the disclosed communica-
tions in order to determine which other privileged materials are on
the same subject matter can be problematic. This potential stum-
bling block is best illustrated by examining several cases.
In Perrignon, the corporation's president testified about
statements made to him by the corporation's in-house counsel
regarding alleged payments by the corporation to a state official.95
The court, finding a same-subject-matter waiver, defined the same
subject matter as conversations between Abrahms, the corporation's
former president, and Nielsen, the former in-house counsel, dealing
with the payments made by the corporate defendants to a particular
state official.96 This is a limited and narrow interpretation of the
same subject matter. However, despite the imposition of the
formalistically broader same-subject-matter standard, the court's
adoption of a relatively narrow definition actually reduced the
amount of additional privileged material that defendants were
compelled to disclose.
Alternatively, the court could have adopted a more expansive
definition of the same subject matter. For example, the defendant
might have been compelled to disclose all discussions and conversa-
tions between all individuals about the corporation's payments to the
identified state official. This more expansive interpretation of the
same subject matter would have enhanced the plaintiffs' ability to
95. Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455,459 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
96. Id. at 461-62.
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obtain privileged information. Thus, although the Perrignon court
adopted a definition of the same subject matter that was undoubtedly
acceptable, the fact that the "same subject matter" can have different
interpretations indicates that courts will find it more difficult to
administer this standard.
The narrow scope identified by the court in Perrignon should be
contrasted with the definition of the same subject matter adopted in
Weil. 7 In Weil, a defense witness testified that "the Fund had been
advised by its Blue Sky counsel that 'it would be best to register
wherever the Fund had a single shareholder.""' The court deemed
the contents of this statement privileged.' The Fund, however,
proceeded to disclose more information pertaining to the Blue Sky
laws by releasing a letter written by "the Fund's in-house counsel
... to Blue Sky counsel, in which [he] suggested that the Fund only
register its shares in certain states." 1" The court defined the same
subject matter as "the substance of Blue Sky counsel's advice
regarding registration of Fund shares pursuant to the Blue Sky laws
of the various states. "'0 This interpretation broadened the mean-
ing of the same subject matter because it did not limit the subject to
communications on that topic between those previously identified
individuals. Thus, it provides for the disclosure of more documents.
A shortcoming inherent in the administration of this standard is
the potential for the absence of consistency and predictability. This
problem is not insurmountable, however, and should not discourage
a court from deeming this the appropriate standard.
D. The Standard's Policy Considerations
Doctrinally, the same-subject-matter standard endorses the
preservation of the attorney-client privilege slightly more than it does
the liberalized discovery policy. Limiting the scope of the waiver
to the same subject matter of the initial disclosure substantially
salvages the attorney-client privilege because fewer documents will
have to be disclosed. In addition, if the court narrowly defines the
97. Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research and Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18
(9th Cir. 1981).
98. Id. at 23.
99. Id.
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
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same subject matter, as the Perrignon court did, an additional
reinforcement for the preservation of the attorney-client privilege is
provided. The Goldman, Sachs court noted this tension that exists
between preserving the attorney-client privilege and fostering a
liberal discovery policy: "This narrow reading of the scope of the
waiver will, in the court's judgment, promote the fairness which the
partial disclosure qualification is designed to encourage while serving
the compelling public policy considerations underlying the attorney-
client privilege." 1" Thus, the less expansive description of the
same subject matter reflects the court's value judgment that retaining
the attorney-client privilege to the greatest extent possible is to be
given more weight than expanding the pool of discoverable informa-
tion.
Although this test probably provides more protection for the
confidentiality of communications between attorneys and their
clients, it may also incorporate the liberal discovery policy. For
example, in one case in which the court discussed the appropri-
ateness of applying the same-subject-matter standard to a particular
discovery situation, it noted that the use of this standard allows for
"full disclosure""°3 that is consistent with the liberal discovery
rules. Presumably, the court believed that requiring the production
of additional documents on a particular topic was more consistent
with the disclosure objectives embodied in the liberal discovery
policy.
In terms of meting out a penalty in order to deter substandard
discovery practices, the same-subject-matter standard, like the
specific document standard, is minimally punitive. The punitive
component of this standard is found in its requirement that additional
privileged material be released to the nondisclosing party. Unfortu-
nately, the precise magnitude of the sanction is contingent upon how
broadly or narrowly the court defines the same subject matter.
Thus, the same-subject-matter standard is unlikely to be the most
effective standard in terms of deterring sloppy discovery practices
and improper motives. In other words, if a court adopts a narrow
definition, the penalty imposed on the disclosing party is reduced and
102. Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, M.D., 412 F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
103. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D.
76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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the effectiveness of any deterrence gained from imposing the
standard is compromised. If a broader definition is adopted, then
the punitive component increases and results in a more substantial
penalty that should provide a greater deterrent to substandard and
dilatory litigation practices. Despite the real potential in the
reduction of this standard's deterrent effect, the potency of the
punitive component of this standard, however, may be revitalized to
some degree because the disclosing party may not want to gamble
about which standard a court will choose.
Since this standard theoretically allows for the potential
disclosure of additional documents, there is always the chance that
the litigation will be impacted in some manner. By improving the
nondisclosing party's odds of obtaining additional materials, the odds
also increase that the compelled production may include a communi-
cation detrimental to the disclosing party's position. Access to any
supplemental materials could also impact settlement negotiations and
could alter the course of the litigation. As a result, this standard
possesses a greater potential for impacting the litigation process from
the disclosing party's perspective, which enhances the standard's
punitive component and bolsters the potential deterrent impact.
E. Conclusion
The same-subject-matter standard, like the specific document
standard, is a relatively narrow scope-of-the-waiver standard.
However, the principal administrative difficulty associated with the
application of this measure-the problems encountered in defining
the same subject matter-can also enable this standard to function as
a broad scope-of-the-waiver test. Although the penalty embodied in
the forced disclosure of additional documents can potentially be
significant and act as an effective deterrent to inferior and question-
able litigation practices, the standard continues to display a bias
towards preserving the attorney-client privilege as opposed to
promulgating a liberal discovery policy.
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IV. The Related-to-the-Same-Subject-Matter Standard
A. Description of the Scope of the Waiver
The related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard requires
producing all privileged communications relating to the subject of the
privileged material originally produced."04 The scope of this third
measure is fairly broad 5 because the nondisclosing party not only
retains the privileged documents actually produced, but also obtains
additional privileged communications that relate to the subject matter
of the specific documents produced.
B. Factors Influencing the Selection of the Standard
There are several principal variables that courts consider when
deciding whether this scope-of-the-waiver test is appropriate.
1. Classification of the Disclosure.-One of the most significant
factors influencing this decision is whether the court classifies the
disclosure as voluntary. 10 6 If the disclosure is voluntary, the court
will be more inclined to apply this broader standard. As the
Standard Chartered Bank court noted, in order to grant the
nondisclosing party's request for the application of the related-to-the-
same-subject-matter standard, the disclosure should be volun-
tary."07 From this guidance, it is fair to conclude that the volun-
tary production of privileged communications is an initial prerequi-
site to the selection of the broader related-to-the-same-subject-matter
104. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that
the production of one privileged document waived the privilege with respect to all
other privileged materials that related to "subject matter of the first document
disclosed"); see also Standard Chartered Bank, 111 F.R.D. at 85 (stating that "the
voluntary production of a privileged document effects a waiver[- as to all other
privileged communications concerning the same subject matter"); Champion Int'l
Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (defining
waiver as applying to all documents that relate to the subject of the privileged matter).
105. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 981 (noting that the related-to-the-same-
subject-matter standard is a potentially broad test); Champion Int'l, 486 F. Supp. at
1330 n.1 (noting the breadth of the related-to-the-same-subject-matter waiver
standard).
106. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980-81 (requiring a waiver of the
privilege in order to adopt the relating-to-the-same-subject-matter standard).
107. Standard Chartered Bank, 111 F.R.D. at 85.
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standard. Additional support for the importance of this factor is
found in First Wisconsin, a case in which the court specifically noted
that the absence of "clear evidence of an intentional waiver"
supported the denial of the nondisclosing party's request for a
related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard.108  However, in
practically the same breath the court seemed to contradict itself by
stating that "[e]ven an inadvertent waiver may extend to documents
not produced which relate to the same subject matter as the docu-
ments for which the privilege was waived.""0 9 Nonetheless,
possibly because the waiver was inadvertent, the court limited the
scope of the waiver to the specific privileged documents pro-
duced.110 The First Wisconsin court's analysis suggests that some
degree of uncertainty exists about the propriety of using the related-
to-the-same-subject-matter test in situations when the disclosure is
inadvertent, or when it is unclear whether the waiver was inadvertent
or voluntary. Parkway Gallery expounds on the confusion over the
mode of disclosure necessary to apply the related-to-the-same-
subject-matter standard."' Although the Parkway Gallery court
acknowledged that the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard is
probably unsuitable in inadvertent disclosure cases,1 2 it did
recognize precisely what the First Wisconsin court did; namely, "a
party attempting to show inadvertent disclosure faces a reduced
standard when the issue is whether communications related to the
disclosed document should be deemed waived as well. 1 13  Thus,
even in a situation involving the inadvertent production of privileged
communications, the related-to-the-same-subject-matter test may be
applicable.
Nonetheless, even the Parkway Gallery court ultimately seemed
to believe that it is inappropriate to apply this standard in a nonvol-
untary disclosure situation. As the court stated, "[i]n a proper case
of inadvertent disclosure, the waiver should cover only the specific




111. Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group,





document in issue;"114 and although an inadvertent disclosure
permits the nondisclosing party to retain the specific privileged
documents produced, "[t]he same is not true for related but still
confidential matters."115  Therefore, although a certain amount of
uncertainty exists, it is fair to surmise that if the disclosure is
voluntary, then the court will be more receptive to granting the
nondisclosing party's request for the imposition of the related-to-the-
same-subject-matter test.
2. The Selective Disclosure Factor.-If the court is unable to
decide whether the disclosure must be inadvertent or voluntary in
order to support the selection of the broader related-to-the-same-
subject-matter test, then evidence that the disclosing party engaged
in the tactical disclosure of privileged material might influence the
court's decision to select this standard. This variable surfaced in
Standard Chartered Bank, a case in which the court denied the
nondisclosing party's request that the related-to-the-same-subject-
matter standard be imposed.11 6 In reaching this decision, the court
observed that there was an absence of evidence indicating that the
disclosing party engaged in selective disclosure." 7 Therefore, the
court's rationale for refusing to impose the related-to-the-same-
subject-matter standard supports the conclusion that if a case
involves strategic disclosure, a court could justifiably select this
standard.
3. Respect for the Litigation Process. -The disclosing party's
actions also influence whether a court will select this standard.
Specifically, the court's inquiry will focus on whether the disclosing
party's actions reflect the professionalism indicative of a proper
respect for the litigation process. For example, if the disclosure
resulted from gross carelessness or inexcusable neglect, a court
might choose the related-to-the-same-subject-matter measure because
the disclosing party's actions indicate the absence of any concern for
upholding the integrity of the litigation process. At least one court
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D.
76, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
117. Id. at 85.
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found that if the facts surrounding the disclosure, regardless of
whether it was inadvertent or voluntary, indicate "that procedures
with regard to maintaining the confidentiality of the document were
[ careless and indifferent to consequences,""' the court may apply
the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard.
However, if the circumstances surrounding the disclosure
establish that the document production was large, that it included few
privileged documents, and that counsel was diligent in satisfying its
duties with respect to the document production, then a court will be
less likely to impose the related-to-the-same-subject-matter stan-
dard." 9  Such circumstances, while arguably involving some
degree of negligence, are nonetheless indicative of the attorney's
awareness that there is an obligation to uphold the integrity of the
discovery process.
C. Administering the Related-To-The-Same-Subject-Matter Standard
The mechanics of the standard are fairly simple to master.
After the court determines which privileged documents were
produced, the court must view each document and define the subject
matter of each privileged communication. Once this task is
completed, the other privileged communications must be examined
and a decision must be made as to which, if any, of these materials
relate to the subject matter identified in the information actually
disclosed. The disclosing party is then compelled to release these
additional documents.
However, in applying this standard, courts frequently confuse
the significant distinction that exists between the same-subject-matter
standard and the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard. In
fact, courts sometimes espouse the position that the same-subject-
matter standard is applicable but then actually apply a standard that
functions in a manner identical to the related-to-the-same-subject-
matter standard. However, these two standards are distinguishable.
Therefore, the initial hurdle in the administration of this standard is
to be certain that the court does not confuse the standards.
Once the court has made the threshold determination of the
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communications "relate to" that subject matter.12 The complexity
of this task was made clear when a trial court decided to apply the
related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard and identified which
additional documents had to be produced, but failed to "fully explain
why the communications were related."121 The appellate court
made the following observations in connection with the difficulty in
executing this chore:
IThe "subject matter" of the waiver could, nevertheless, be defined in a
number of different ways. Did the district court mean, for instance, to
define the "subject matter" as all communications "relating" to the adjust-
ment entries .... Or, alternatively, was the waiver limited to those intra-
Company communications revealing that Company's accounting adjust-
ments were made upon the advice of counsel, in which case is it not clear
whether the actual notes of the meeting must be disclosed? Given the
potential implications of a broad definition of the subject matter of
Company's waiver, we think it appropriate to remand to the district court
for further consideration of that issue."
Thus, the difficulty associated with determining which additional
communications are "related to the same subject matter" complicates
the administration of this standard.
D. The Standard's Policy Considerations
Given that the attorney-client privilege is severely compromised
if this test is utilized, it is accurate to conclude that the standard
favors a liberalized discovery policy as opposed to the preservation
of the attorney-client privilege." This doctrinal position simply
reflects the notion that if the discovery practices of the disclosing
party's lawyer were substandard, unconscionable, or manipulative,
the disclosing party cannot complain"' if the court decides that the
appropriate remedy is to apply a scope-of-the-waiver standard that
120. See Harding, supra note 3, at 468 n.8 (noting the "obvious inherent
difficulty" in determining what constitutes "relating to the same subject matter").
121. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
123. The In re Sealed Case court noted that "the attorney-client privilege is of
ancient lineage and of continuing importance," but the privilege must fall to the
wayside if the related-to-the-same-subject-matter test is used. Id. at 980.
124. Of course, theoretically the client has recourse against the attorney. See
supra note 60 (discussing the possibilities of a malpractice lawsuit in such circum-
stances).
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
makes preserving the attorney-client privilege less important than
expanding the body of discoverable information."2
Since upholding the protections afforded by the attorney-client
privilege is given less emphasis under this standard, the punitive
consequence of this standard is more pronounced. The disclosing
party receives a greater penalty because of the requirement that it
release all documents related to the subject matter of the initially
disclosed privileged communications.126 The obvious result of this
remedy is the heightened possibility that the disclosing party will
experience some degree of adverse exposure 7 because of the
disclosure of more privileged material. The threat of a substantial
supplemental disclosure should deter inferior discovery prac-
tices. 128
While the broader standard ideally punishes the disclosing party,
the nondisclosing party stands to reap a benefit from the punitive
function of this test because it gains access to additional privileged
documents. In terms of the impact on the litigation process, at least
one court has noted that this broad standard can significantly impact
the adjudication of a case.129 Thus, the penalty facet of the test
can place the disclosing party at an extreme disadvantage if, due to
the broader scope of the waiver, it finds itself in the unenviable
position of being compelled to produce "smoking guns." Clearly,
when a party produces a previously confidential, "smoking gun"
document, it is less likely that the disclosing party will be able to
125. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980 (noting that "[niormally the amount
of care taken to ensure confidentiality reflects the importance of that confidentiality
to the holder of the privilege").
126. 1d.
127. See id. (noting that the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard can cause
grave injury to the disclosing party).
128. The court in In re Sealed Case acknowledged the link between the
production of additional documents and the carelessness reflected in the initial
disclosure by making the following observation:
[There is] the danger that the "waiver" will extend to all related matters,
perhaps causing grave injury to the organization. But that is as it should
be. . . . In other words, if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it
must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications like
jewels-if not crown jewels.
d.
129. Id. at 981.
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negotiate a favorable settlement. In contrast, if the party does not
have to produce additional materials, its settlement position would
be less likely to be altered. By being forced to surrender additional
privileged communications, the producing party is less likely to
improve or stabilize its previous position on the contested issues.
However, one could certainly argue that if the disclosing party had
not been so careless or had refrained from engaging in selective
disclosure, then it would not have been subjected to this stringent
sanction. Again, this is an instance where the totality of the punitive
aspects of the standard could improve the effectiveness of this
standard as a deterrent to inappropriate discovery practices.
E. Conclusion
In sum, the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard is one of
the broader scope-of-the-waiver tests. Although the application of
this standard can potentially have far-reaching effects on the
litigation process and severely damage the litigating position of the
disclosing party, courts may choose this broader standard because it
is more likely to deter unacceptable litigation practices such as
selective disclosure or sloppy document production. Furthermore,
doctrinally, the endorsement of a liberal discovery policy can be
seen as a natural consequence flowing from the decision to forsake
the attorney-client privilege by the refusal to adopt a narrower
standard.
V. The General Subject Matter Standard
A. Description of the Scope of the Wiver
The final and broadest scope-of-the-waiver standard, the general
subject matter measure, requires the disclosing party to supplement
the initial disclosure by producing not only all communications
related to the subject matter but also all privileged documents that
refer to or mention in whole or in part the general topic of the
subject matter of the specific communications originally pro-
1995] 405
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATON
duced. 130  Obviously, this standard is extremely broad, as the
offending party not only forfeits the privilege with respect to the
original privileged information, but must supplement the release of
information with a voluminous amount of additional privileged
materials on the general topic of the specific documents disclosed.
Thus, the scope of this standard operates as a wholesale cancellation
of the right to protect an entire category of information.
B. The Key Factor Influencing the Selection of this Standard
In order to determine whether this standard is proper, the
egregiousness of the disclosing party's behavior13 1 occupies a
position of paramount importance. In a case adopting this measure
of the extent of the waiver, the court scrutinized the actions of the
disclosing party that resulted in the revelation of privileged mater-
ial. 132 The disclosing party's actions were spurious, possessed the
indicia of bad faith, reflected efforts to stymie discovery, and
undermined the fair operation of the adjudicatory process.133 The'
court was clearly aware of the deliberateness of the disclosing
party's dilatory maneuvers; it noted that the disclosing party had"engaged in a calculated effort to delay compliance with the
Department's request by a variety of tactics, in the main related to
claims of privilege."134
In addition, the court noted that when the nondisclosing party
reasonably requested more information on the existence of the claims
of privilege in order to assess the veracity of these claims, the
disclosing party "failed to cooperate even in a minimally appropriate
manner."1 35 It also became apparent to the court that some of the
disclosing party's claims of privilege were baseless. 136  The court
130. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1990)
(holding that the disclosing party must surrender "any and all [privileged] communica-
tions addressing those topics, in whole or in part").
131. Id. at 1-3; cf. Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F.
Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (theorizing that if the court had found a waiver,
it would have applied the specific document standard given the disclosing party's
cooperativeness).
132. Western Electric, 132 F.R.D. at 1.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1-2.
136. Id. at 2.
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made the following observation about the totality of the disclosing
party's behavior in its quest to prevent certain information from
being discoverable: "It is inescapable from this almost three-year
history that US West has been engaged in a systematic and calcu-
lated effort to frustrate the Department's legitimate demands for
information, frequently by patently frivolous and usually dilatory
maneuvers."137 Not surprisingly, the court held that the disclosing
party had waived the attorney-client privilege13 and declared that
the scope of the waiver extended to "any and all communications
addressing those topics, in whole or in part." 13 9 As indicated
above, the principal factor relied upon by the court in reaching the
decision to choose this standard was the disclosing party's horren-
dous behavior."4 In fact, the court even stated that the classifica-
tion of the disclosure of the privileged information as inadvertent or
voluntary was an irrelevant factor in the decision as to whether the
general subject matter standard should have been selected. 41
Apparently, the deliberateness and culpability of the disclosing
party's antics surpassed any weight the court might have given to
other factors, such as classification of the waiver or the presence of
a strategic disclosure.
C. Administering the General Subject Matter Standard
Once the court determines that this is the appropriate measure,
then it must examine the specific communications disclosed, define
the general subject matter of those materials, and compel disclosure
of all other privileged communications that refer to or mention, in
whole or in part, the general subject matter of the disclosed
documents. Then, the offending party must produce all privileged
communications that satisfy this designation.
An initial obstacle in the administration of this measure exists
when the court must define the general subject matter of the specific
documents revealed by the disclosing party. Given the magnitude of
the court's disgust at the offending party's actions, it is not incon-
ceivable that courts would likely adopt an expansive definition of the
137. Western Electric, 132 F.2d at 2.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2.
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general subject matter of the initially disclosed documents. Like-
wise, the court is likely to construe broadly which additional
documents a party must produce.
An important consideration in the administration of this standard
is that courts occasionally confuse the related-to-the-same-subject-
matter standard and the general subject matter standard.142 Any
confusion arising in this area is understandable because, at first
glance, the two standards appear to be remarkably similar.
However, important distinctions exist between the two standards.
First, the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard requires the
court to select for production certain documents that have a closer
nexus to the topic of the specific documents disclosed. The general
subject matter standard, however, compels disclosure even when
there is a more tenuous link to the initially disclosed document and,
thus, mandates the wholesale cancellation of the right to use the
attorney-client privilege to protect an entire body of documents that
mention or make any partial or complete reference to the general
subject matter of the documents specifically disclosed.143
D. The Standard's Policy Considerations
On the doctrinal plane, the general subject matter standard
eliminates the attorney-client privilege with respect to an entire
parcel of information pertaining to a particular subject, thereby
promulgating a liberal discovery policy. However, it is doubtful that
a court's general preference for liberalized discovery over the
preservation of the attorney-client privilege is the sole or primary
policy consideration that motivates a court to adopt this measure.
Instead, the decision to adopt this standard more likely reflects the
court's strong annoyance and disgust with the disclosing party's
actions.
Because the standard requires the production of any information
that mentions or refers to the general topic of the specifically
disclosed documents, it possesses a tremendous punitive component:
The offender relinquishes the right to prevent the discovery of what
142. See Western Electric, 132 F.2d at2-3 (finding a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege as to all communications on subjects covered by the attorney-client
communications that were inadvertently or deliberately disclosed).
143. Id.
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could be an enormous amount of material. In addition, the greater
number of documents that this standard can potentially require to be
produced significantly increases the chances that a party may
produce an unfavorable document. Undoubtedly, such a disclosure
would impede the offending party in its ability to obtain a favorable
settlement. Additionally, the offending party may have to reorganize
and revamp its prosecution or defense strategy given that its
opponent possesses an extraordinary number of privileged documents
and other materials that could give the opponent increased insight
into the existing strategy. Ideally, the magnitude of the punitive
consequences from the imposition of this standard will result in an
effective deterrent to unprofessional practices that are unfair to the
opponent and disrespectful of the litigation process.
E. Conclusion
The general subject matter standard is an extremely expansive
measure. If a court imposes this test, the disclosing party confronts
a situation that could have a far-reaching negative impact on its
position in the resolution of the matter. The imposition of this
standard may often have the effect of opening the flood gates of
discovery, and it is primarily the disclosing party's motives- and
actions that enable a court to feel no hesitancy in instituting this
expansive test.
VI. A Proposal for a New Standard
Each of the four scope-of-the-waiver tests has its strengths and
weaknesses. However, perhaps the most formidable obstacle in
resolving the issue of how to decide the appropriate scope of the
waiver is the present lack of consistency in the application of the
critical factors for selecting one standard over another. The
following proposal is aimed at simplifying the court's task in
selecting an appropriate scope-of-the-waiver standard and at
improving the level of certainty for litigants.
The primary objective steering a court's decision in resolving
the extent of the waiver issue should be to accommodate both the
attorney-client privilege policy and the liberal discovery policy. In
most cases, this will require the court to balance the two principles
with the goal of salvaging the attorney-client privilege to the greatest
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extent possible as well as fairly determining what should appropri-
ately be surrendered to the public domain. 1"
In order to accomplish this goal, the courts should follow
several rules. First, and perhaps most importantly, classifying the
disclosure as inadvertent or voluntary should play no role in
selecting the appropriate measure. Instead, the decisionmaking body
will focus on the substance of the disclosed, privileged communica-
tions. Essentially, the court must determine whether, because of the
disclosure of confidential information, the disclosing party is placed
in a significantly better position than its opponent. The courts may
accomplish this by examining the specific documents disclosed and
then conducting an in camera inspection of other privileged materials
on the same subject matter as the specific communications revealed
in order to determine whether there is an unfair disparity between
what was disclosed and what was not disclosed. If the court decides
that a disclosure resulted in unfairness, the court should apply the
same-subject-matter standard. This facet of the proposed approach
acknowledges that a disclosure occurred and that in order to equalize
any advantage, intended or unintended, full discovery on the same
subject matter is necessary. However, in order to accommodate the
attorney-client privilege concern, the court should narrowly define
the same subject matter. Furthermore, requiring the disclosing party
to forfeit the privilege for an uncertain number of additional
documents should function as a deterrent to substandard litigation
practices. However, under this scenario, the primary objective of
the test in resolving this issue is not to deter unruly litigation
practices.
This new proposal can be applied to the situation in Parkway
Gallery where the court noted that if a disclosure places the
disclosing party at an advantage or if the disclosing party is
attempting to make some other improper use of the disclosure, then
the same-subject-matter standard would apply. 145 Likewise, under
144. This aspect of the overriding objective of the proposed test by no means
prohibits a party from seeking a protective order to limit who can have access to the
previously privileged communications. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (allowing a
party from whom discovery has been requested protection from embarrassment, undue
expense, or oppression).
145. Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group,
Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
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this scheme, the same-subject-matter standard would be the appropri-
ate scope-of-the-waiver standard because the disclosing party tried
to gain an advantage. Similarly, in Perrignon a party tried to allow
only one individual to testify and prohibit another individual from
testifying about the same topic in an effort to gain an advantage over
the adversary.'46 Under this proposal, the fact that the disclosing
party would gain an advantage if its efforts were successful supports
the use of the same-subject-matter standard.
If after examining the disclosed documents, and those on the
same subject matter, the court determines that the disclosure did not
bestow a significant benefit upon the disclosing party, then the court
should apply the narrow specific document standard. This portion
of the proposed approach certainly endorses the attorney-client
privilege more than liberal discovery policy, but it is warranted
because the court is not presented with a situation in which the
disclosing party benefited from the disclosure, or if there is any
benefit, it is minuscule and will not have any significant impact on
the parties' adversarial relationship. In other words, this is not a
situation where the court must attempt to equalize the parties'
positions in relation to each other; therefore, the court should protect
the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, this approach comports
with the liberal discovery policy of the Federal Rules because it
permits disclosure through the retention of the specific privileged
communication. This portion of the proposed test can be easily
applied in cases such as Turner & Newall,47 Bud Antle,'48 and
Champion International.49 For example, Champion International
involved a situation where the disclosure was "a mere appendage to
discoverable technical material" 150 and, as such, did not place the
disclosing party in a better position. Therefore, since the disclosing
party did not benefit, the specific document standard would be the
146. Perrignon v. Berger Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Ca. 1978)
("Under these circumstances defendants had much to gain by allowing Abrams to
answer plaintiffs' questions so long as they could preserve HAS's privilege so as to
keep Nielsen from having to give his version of the same [privileged] conversation.").
147. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178 (D. Mass.
1991).
148. Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc, 131 F.R.D. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
149. Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D.
Ga. 1980).
150. Id. at 1333.
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appropriate measure. Similarly, in Bud Antle, while the court went
to great lengths to explain why the disclosure of a privileged
communication occurred and chastised the disclosing party for this
indiscretion, the court never mentioned that the communication
bestowed a benefit upon the disclosing party.' 5' As a result,
adhering to the concept that there was an absence of any benefit to
the disclosing party, the court selected the specific document scope-
of-the-waiver standard." 2 The Turner & Newall case presented a
similar scenario-the disclosure of privileged documents that did not
confer a benefit on the disclosing party or suggest that the disclosing
party attempted to gain an advantage through the disclosure." 3
Again, in accordance with the proposed approach for determining the
appropriate scope-of-the-waiver test, the court limited the scope to
the document-only standard. 5 4
The final component of the proposed approach focuses solely on
the actions taken by the disclosing party in connection with the
circumstances surrounding the disclosure and the discovery proceed-
ings. If there is evidence to support the conclusion that the
disclosing party is uncooperative and its actions are egregious,
disrespectful of the litigation process, and unconcerned with
operating at some level of parity against its adversary, then the court
should impose the general subject matter waiver standard. 155
Under this scenario, it is the disclosing party who creates a waiver
of the general topic of the disclosed materials because its actions and
attitude are inconsistent with any interest it might have in preserving
its right to the confidences afforded by fair and professional
litigation practices. Obviously, the application of this test inherently
fits in with liberal discovery policy because of the compelled
disclosure of every communication referring to or pertaining to the
general topic of the disclosed documents. However, this is not the
151. Bud Antle, 131 F.R.D. at 181-84.
152. Id.
153. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178, 179-83 (D.
Mass. 1991).
154. Id.
155. For those who are concerned about the loss of the related-to-the-same-
subject-matter's punitive component, which theoretically required the production of
a greater number of privileged communications, the general subject matter standard
can handle those cases when there is egregious behavior and the court might have
previously used the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard.
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primary doctrinal concern of this portion of the proposed test.
Instead, deterrence is the guiding principle when the court selects
this standard. Awareness of this remedy should deter litigants from
engaging in specious, egregious, and unprofessional behavior.
There are several examples when courts have resorted to more
limited waiver scopes, but under the proposed test could have
adopted the general subject matter standard. For example, in
Bierman, in a rather sharp opinion, the court commented on how the
disclosing party's assertions of the privilege "seem[ed] specious and
dilatory." '156 Under the proposed test, this behavior would be
unacceptable and, to deter and punish such incidents, the court
would be free to apply the general subject matter standard. Duplan
Corporation'57 is another case in which the application of the
general subject matter standard would have been appropriate. In that
case, an irate court noted that not only did the disclosing party
reveal documents that were beneficial to its position and refused to
produce other incriminating privileged materials on the same subject,
but also acted with hostility and distrust towards the other attorney
and asserted some doubtful claims of privilege.5 ' Under the
proposed approach, this case would be a prime candidate for the
application of the general subject matter standard and the guaranteed
relinquishment of an entire category of privileged communications
on a general topic would likely be sufficient to punish this behavior
and deter such behavior from occurring in the future.
Although the primary objective of the general subject matter
scope-of-the-waiver standard is to penalize the disclosing party, one
might ask why the disclosing party must lose the protection afforded
to an entire group or category of documents rather than preserving
the privilege and receiving sanctions under one of the existing rules
when egregious conduct occurs during discovery proceedings. 159
156. Bierman v. Marcus, 122 F. Supp. 250, 252 (D.N.J. 1954).
157. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
158. Id. at 1191-92.
159. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (authorizing the court to impose an"appropriate sanction" on an attorney who violates the Rule); FED. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(4), (c) (listing a variety of sanctions and remedies available to the court when
one party fails to disclose information or cooperate in discovery).
It should be noted that the nondisclosing party can no longer use Rule 11 as a
means of resolving the issue, because the latest amendments to the Federal Rules
specifically exclude discovery proceedings from the ambit of Rule 11. FED. R. Civ.
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Nothing prohibits the nondisclosing party from moving to compel the
production of additional documents pursuant to Rule 37(a) and, if the
motion is granted, to seek reasonable expenses for the efforts of
having to compel the disclosing party to release the additional
privileged documents. The availability of sanctions under Rules
37(a)(4) and 26(g)(3), however, should not prohibit the existence of
another sanction-the general subject matter standard scope-of-the-
waiver test. In fact, the certainty and magnitude of the penalty
created by this test might even have a greater deterrent effect than
the other rules, because the disclosing party is acutely aware of the
consequences of his or her actions. Therefore, the codified sanctions
and the punitive aspect of the scope of the waiver can coexist.
However, there might be a preference for the proposed test because
it sets forth a remedial scheme that has less discretion, and,
therefore, offers greater certainty and accountability, yet has enough
flexibility to allow the court to decide if the focus should be to
eliminate any unfairness in the proceedings or to significantly
penalize a litigant.
It is necessary to note that this proposed test excludes using the
related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard for several reasons.
First, it is difficult to assess which documents are "related to" the
same subject matter. This assessment creates a tremendous
administrative burden on an already overly taxed court system and
places an unnecessary burden on the litigants as they quibble about
what is "related to" and what is not "related to." It will simply be
easier for the court to declare what is the "same subject" and compel
production of those documents. Secondly, the courts frequently
confuse the related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard with the
general subject matter standard. However, each standard serves a
different and distinct goal in the litigation scheme. The goal of the
related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard is more similar to the
same-subject-matter standard-curbing substandard discovery
practices that are unfair to the nondisclosing party and that adversely
effect the integrity of the process of adjudication." ° Conversely,
the general subject matter standard's primary function is punitive and
its goal is more oriented toward ensuring that the system retains its
P. 11(d).




integrity. Furthermore, the confusion between the two existing
standards could obviate the court's motivation for selecting a
particular standard. Thus, it would be prudent to eliminate the
related-to-the-same-subject-matter standard from the new scope-of-
the-waiver scheme.
In sum, the proposed test reorganizes the existing tests so that
they will be more effective in achieving greater consistency in
results, providing guidance on how parties should behave during
discovery proceedings, and notifying litigants as to which remedial
measures will be followed in a given disclosure and scope-of-the-
waiver situation. This optimal balancing of the policy consider-
ations, as embodied in the proposed resolution scheme, should
provide a more equitable outcome for the parties and the litigation
system. Thus, the end result will be a fairly easy and workable
process that considers and properly incorporates the various policy
considerations.
VII. Conclusion
Given the ever-increasing size of document productions and the
importance they occupy in the discovery component of the adjudica-
tory process,161 it is inevitable that more cases will raise the scope-
of-the-waiver issue. As discussed, there are different variables that
affect the determination of the most appropriate standard to apply in
a particular waiver situation. Several variables appear to carry
greater weight in a court's decision as to which of the four scope-of-
the-waiver measures is most appropriate. These include the
following: the classification of the disclosure as voluntary or
inadvertent; evidence that the disclosure involves selective disclo-
sure; the degree of unfairness to the nondisclosing party that results
161. This position will probably be enhanced because the revised Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not limit the number of Rule 34 requests that a litigant can
make. FED. R. CIv. P. 34. This freedom should be contrasted with the situation
involving other discovery devices, such as depositions and interrogatories, for which
the revised Rules impose quantitative limitations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30, 31, 33
(limiting each party to 10 depositions and 25 interrogatories, unless the parties enter
into a stipulation or obtain leave of court).
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from the disclosure; and the disclosing party's culpability in
connection with the disclosure of the privileged communications,
which can range from mere sloppiness to intentional dilatory tactics.
In addition, each standard considers and accommodates one or more
of the following policy concerns: the proper role that the attorney-
client privilege should play in the case; the proper role that the
liberal discovery policy should play in the case; how a particular test
reinforces the integrity of the litigation process; and how the punitive
function of a given test will deter unscrupulous attorney practices.
The standards vary in the ease or difficulty of their adminis-
tration. The document-only standard is the simplest. The remaining
standards can be problematic in their application because courts can
find it difficult to define the subject matter of the specific documents
disclosed. This consequence can jeopardize the effectiveness of the
deterrent effect of these standards.
In order to remedy some of these shortcomings, a new approach
is advocated. Under the proposed approach to determining which
scope-of-the-waiver test to apply, the court will dispose of the
present formal inadvertent-versus-voluntary distinction and instead
will focus on the substance of the disclosure and the general
deportment of the disclosing party. If the disclosure provides a
significant benefit to the disclosing party, then the court will apply
the same-subject-matter standard. On the other hand, if the
disclosure confers no benefit or a minimum benefit, then the
nondisclosing party will only be allowed to retain the specifically
disclosed documents. If the disclosing party engages in unprofes-
sional behavior that indicates improper motives-such as dilatory
tactics or selective disclosure-and a general disregard for upholding
the integrity of the adjudicatory process, then the general subject
matter standard is applicable. This test is fairly easy to apply and
balances the major policy considerations evident in scope-of-the-
waiver inquiries.
Until the time that this test is adopted, the courts will continue
to make their selection from the existing four standards. Therefore,
to avoid the imposition of any of the more expansive scope-of-the-
waiver standards, it would be prudent for attorneys to adhere to the
following guidelines: Always act in good faith during discovery
proceedings; if privileged communications are disclosed, then
attempt to characterize the disclosure as inadvertent; refrain from
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engaging in selective disclosure; and be cooperative when complying
with discovery requests.
